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EXCESSIVE BAIL AND CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE SECTION 13521
California Penal Code section 13521 requires that a criminal de-
fendant must deposit an additional five dollars for every twenty dol-
lars of bail prescribed by the judge for his release.' The statute fur-
ther provides that the penalty deposit is a contingent payment which
is to be returned if bail is returned, and is forfeited if bail is also for-
feited. 2  The penalty deposit may be waived at the discretion of the
judge in the event it would create a hardship on the defendant.
3
On August 30, 1971, the court of appeals in McDermott v Su-
perior Court4 held that section 13521 was unconstitutional in that the
requirement for the penalty deposit violated provisions in the Cali-
fornia Constitution which prohibit excessive bail in criminal cases.5
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court granted a hearing in Mc-
Dermott-the hearing was set for December 6, 1971-thereby vacat-
mg the lower court judgment. 6 Reference to McDermott in this note
will be to the appellate court opinion in the unofficial reports and
will involve the reasoning of the appellate court relative to the excessive
bail issue.7 This note will analyze the bail and penalty provisions of
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 13521 (West Supp. 1971) provides: "On and after
September 18, 1959, there shall be levied a penalty assessment in an amount equal
to five dollars ($5) for every twenty dollars ($20), or fraction thereof, of every fine,
penalty, and forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for criminal offenses.
"When any deposit of bail is made for an offense to which this section applies,
the person making such deposit shall also deposit a sufficient amount to include the
assessment pre[sjcribed m this section for forfeited bail. If bail is forfeited, the
amount of such assessment shall be transmitted by the clerk of the court to the
county treasury and thence to the State Treasury pursuant to this section. If bail is
returned, the assessment shall also be returned.
"In any case where a person convicted of any offense to which this section ap-
plies is imprisoned until the fine is satisfied, the judge may waive all or any part of
the penalty assessment the payment of which would work a hardship on the person
convicted or Ins immediate family."
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 97 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Ct. App. 1971), hearing granted, Oct. 27, 1971.
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
6. In California, upon the grant of a hearing by the supreme court, the court
of appeal's decision loses all effect as a judgment or as precedent to be followed in the
decision of legal questions that may thereafter arise. CAL. RULES oF Cr. (Misc. R.)
976(e) (West 1971). See, e.g., Ponce v. Marr, 47 Cal. 2d 159, 161, 301 P.2d 837,
839 (1956); Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 483-84, 66 P.2d 438, 438-39 (1937).
7. See Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 69 Cal. App. 2d 639, 650, 160 P.2d 37,
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section 13521 and will review the reasoning of the court of appeals in
its holding that such provisions constituted excessive bail and were thus
unconstitutional. The note will also discuss Sawyer v. Barbour,' the
primary California case authority relied upon by the state attorney
general for the proposition that the penalty deposit required under
section 13521 does not constitute excessive bail, and will conclude
that the court of appeals in McDermott was correct in its ruling.
The Factual Setting in McDermott
Petitioner McDermott faced criminal charges, and the court set
bail for his release from custody at $1,000 plus a $250 penalty deposit.9
McDermott challenged the constitutionality of the penalty deposit on
the grounds that it violated the California and United States con-
stitutional guarantees against excessive bail." The court of appeals
agreed with McDermott and held that section 13521 violated
California constitutional provisions which prohibit the imposition of
excessive bail.' The court reasoned that since it is left to the discre-
tion of the judge to determine the amount of "'reasonable" bail under
California Penal Code section 1275, any additional amount imposed
upon the defendant to secure his release from custody was per se un-
reasonable and therefore the penalty deposit required under section
13521 was unconstitutional as excessive bail.'12  The court cited ap-
provingly the findings of the San Francisco Committee on Crime13
which had been formed to study the operations of the various courts
in the San Francisco judicial system."4 The committee had issued a
report on the criminal court of San Francisco, and in its study of the
bail and recognizance system had also concluded that section 13521
was "probably unconstitutional as a violation of due process or a
denial of equal protection of the laws."' 5  The committee felt that the
penalty assessment provisions of section 13521 deviated from the only
permissible purpose of bail-to require the accused to post sufficient
collateral to insure his presence in court.16 The committee's objec-
43 (1945), where the court of appeal quoted at length from the opinion in a vacated
and later dismissed case because its analysis and conclusions were "logical, persuasive
and correct."
8. 142 Cal. App. 2d 827, 300 P.2d 187 (1956).
9. 97 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72.
10, Id. at 172.
11. Id. at 174.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 172.
14. SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL COURT
OF SAN FRANCISCO, pt. II, Bail and O.R. Release (1971).
15. Id. at 31.
16. Id.
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tion to section 13521 was that the statutory penalty deposit made it
more difficult for an accused to post bail because the amount of the
prospective penalty assessment was added onto the figure previously
set to insure the defendant's presence, and thus the net effect of the
statute was to levy a tax or fine upon a person simply because he had
been accused of a crime." The committee recommended that the
legislature amend section 13521 to eliminate the penalty deposit and
to provide simply that on the forfeiture of bail, 25 percent of the bail
be paid to the police officer's training fund, thus meeting the revenue
requirements intended by the legislature and eliminating the extra bur-
den imposed on the criminal defendant seeking release on bail.1
8
The court of appeals in McDermott 9 also noted that if the pen-
alty assessment were deemed to be a fine, it would still be unconstitu-
tional. The court reasoned that the defendant seeking admission to
bail is not a convicted offender, and to thus impose a fine on one who
had not been convicted of an unlawful act would be to impose punish-
ment before conviction which would thereby violate due process."0
The court in McDermott discussed the fact that penal code sec-
tion 1275 contains no provision for punishing the defendant or for
raising revenue for the state, and that the statute does not set any
specific amount for bail. Instead, the amount of bail is left solely to
the judge's determination based on the defendant's record, the seri-
ousness of the charges against him, and the probability that the de-
fendant will appear for trial. The court concluded that since section
1275 provides the relevant factors which the judge is to consider
in setting "reasonable" bail, any additional amount required to secure
the defendant's release from custody is per se unreasonable, and the
penalty deposit required under section 13521 was thus unconstitu-
tional.
Bail Set for a Criminal Offense
Various connotations have been accorded the term "bail," but in
its most popular sense it is the security given to insure the subsequent
appearance of a prisoner released from imprisonment before the termi-
nation of criminal proceedings against him.2 ' The courts have con-
sistently held that the only permissible use of bail in a criminal case
is to dissuade the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the indicting
forum,22 and that bail is not to be used to punish the defendant nor to
17. Id.
18. Id. at 32.
19. 97 Cal. Rptr. at 173-74.
20. Id.
21. Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal. App. 2d 827, 833, 300 P.2d 187, 190 (1956).
22. In r-e Newbern, 55 Cal. 2d 500, 504, 360 P.2d 43, 45, 11 Cal. Rptr. 547,
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raise revenue for the state.23  The courts have also stated that the
amount of bail required in each case is properly left to the discretion
of the trial judge giving due regard to these basic principles.24  Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 1275 has incorporated into statutory form
the relevant factors to be considered by the judge in setting bail.
In fixing the amount of bail, the judge . . . shall take into con-
sideration the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous
criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his appear-
ing at the trial or hearing of the case.2 5
In Stack v. Boyle21 the United States Supreme Court held that
bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to
assure the defendant's presence at trial was excessive and violated the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Since the
sole permissible purpose of bail in California is to secure the defend-
ant's presence at trial, 28 the Stack conclusion would appear fully ap-
plicable to bail requirements in California. In any event, bail set at a
higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to assure the de-
fendant's presence at trial is excessive and violates the California Con-
stitution.29  Since section 1275 provides the relevant criteria to be util-
ized by the judge in establishing "reasonable" bail, the additional de-
posit required under section 13521 to secure the defendant's release
from custody would, by definition, be excessive and thus unconsti-
tutional as was held by the McDermott court.
California Penal Code Section 13521-Bail or Penalty?
The California attorney general had argued in McDermott that
no excessive bail problem was involved because section 13521 pro-
vided for the inclusion of the additional deposit for the prospective
penalty assessment within the total amount fixed by the court to insure
the defendant's appearance.3" Therefore, since the judge would include
549 (1961); In re Brumback, 46 Cal. 2d 810, 813, 299 P.2d 217, 219 (1956);
Ex parte Duncan, 54 Cal. 75, 77 (1879); Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal. App. 2d 827,
833, 300 P.2d 187, 190 (1956); People v. Calvert, 129 Cal. App. 2d 693, 698,
277 P.2d 834, 838 (1954); General Cas. Co. v. Justice's Court, 41 Cal. App. 2d 784,
788, 107 P.2d 663, 665 (1940); County of Los Angeles v. Maga, 97 Cal. App. 688,
692, 276 P. 352, 353 (1929).
23. See authorities cited in note 22 supra.
24. See Wadey v. Justice Court, 176 Cal. App. 2d 426, 428, 1 Cal. Rptr. 382,
384 (1959); In re Morehead, 107 Cal. App. 2d 346, 349, 237 P.2d 335, 337 (1951);
In re Tsuyi Horiuchi, 105 Cal. App. 714, 715, 288 P. 708, 708-09 (1930).
25. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1275 (West 1970).
26. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
27. Id. at 5.
28. See authorities cited in note 22 supra.
29. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
30. 97 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
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the amount required under section 13521 in fixing the defendant's bail,
the statute did not require the defendant to post any collateral to se-
cure his release above the amount of bail thus established. The at-
torney general thus concluded that section 13521 could not possibly be
interpreted as imposing excessive bail upon the defendant. The at-
torney general's interpretation, however, does not appear warranted in
view of the express statutory language in section 13521.
Section 13521 expressly provides that a 25 percent penalty as-
sessment is to be added onto every fine, penalty, and forfeiture im-
posed by the courts for criminal offenses.31 The section further pro-
vides that when the bail deposit is made, an additional deposit shall
also be made to cover the amount of the prospective penalty assess-
ment.32 The statute distinguishes between the amount posted as
bail and the amount deposited for the penalty assessment when the bail
is forfeited or returned. 3 When bail is forfeited, the penalty is im-
posed and the amount of the penalty deposit is to be transmitted by
the clerk of the court to the county treasury and thence to the state
treasury; when bail is returned to the defendant, the amount deposited
for the prospective penalty assessment is also to be returned to the de-
fendant.
34
As previously noted, "bail" is generally interpreted to mean the
security given to ensure the appearance of a prisoner in order to ob-
tain his release prior to the termination of proceedings against him."
If the legislature had intended that the penalty assessment be included
as part of that security, the language in the statute could hardly have
been more inappropriate, since the statute clearly provides that the de-
posit for the penalty assessment is in addition to "bail." Thus, by the
express terms of the statute, the legislature more clearly intended that the
determination of the amount fixed by the court to insure the defend-
ant's appearance-the bail-precede the determination of the penalty
assessment. Therefore, the argument of the attorney general that the
penalty assessment deposit under section 13521 should be consid-
ered as part of the "bail" appears to be refuted by the language of
the statute.
The attorney general had further argued that unless the amount of
the penalty deposit under section 13521 was considered as part of the
amount set as bail, there would be a possible conflict with other Cali-
fornia Penal Code sections. 6 He argued that since Penal Code see-
31. CAL. PEN. CODE § 13521 (West 1970).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
36. 97 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
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tions 1269(b) and 1295 provide for the discharge of the accused upon
the posting of bail, the penalty assessment must necessarily be included
as part of the bail since posting bail is the only requirement for
discharge of the accused from custody.37 If the penalty assess-
ment were not included as part of the bail amount, argued the attorney
general, the accused could obtain release upon the posting of bail
without having made any deposit for the prospective penalty assess-
ment and this would be contrary to the provisions of section 13521.1 8
The court in McDermott countered this argument, however, by
pointing out that if the penalty assessment were considered to be in-
cluded as part of the bail amount so as to avoid conflict with Penal
Code sections 1269(b) and 1295 as had been contended by the attor-
ney general, section 13521 would nonetheless conflict with other Penal
Code sections if so construed.39  For example, Penal Code sections
1307 and 1463 provide for fixed percentage allocations of every dol-
lar of forfeited bail between city and county treasuries.4" Neither
statute provides for the allocation of any bail revenue to the police of-
ficer's training fund as was specifically provided under section 13521.
If section 13521 were construed as calling for the inclusion of the
penalty assessment within the amount fixed as bail as contended by the
attorney general, 25 percent of the funds which were to be allocated
solely to the city and county treasuries under sections 1307 and 1463
would have to be reallocated to the police officer's training fund in
order to satisfy the revenue requirements of section 13521.41 Since
section 13521 did not purport to amend the allocation provisions of
37. Id. (emphasis added). CAL. PEN. CODE § 1269b(c) (West Supp. 1971) pro-
vides: "Upon posting such bail . . . the defendant or arrested person shall be dis-
charged from custody as to the the offense on which the bail is posted." Id. § 1295
(West 1970) provides: "The defendant, or any other person, at any time after
an order admitting defendant to bail or after the arrest and booking of a defend-
ant for having committed a misdemeanor, instead of giving bail may deposit
with the clerk of the court in which the defendant is held to answer or notified to
appear for arraignment, the sum mentioned in the order, or if no order, in the schedule
of bail previously fixed by the judges of said court, and upon delivering to the officer
in whose custody defendant is a certificate of the deposit, defendant must be dis-
charged from custody."
38. See Brief for Respondent at 7, McDermott v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Rptr.
171 (Ct. App. 1971).
39. 97 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
40. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1307, 1463 (West 1970). Penal Code section
1307 provides that bail deposited with the superior court and forfeited goes to the
county treasury. Penal Code section 1463 provides that forfeited bail collected by
municipal and justice courts is to be distributed, in percentages fixed by that statute,
among county and city treasuries, depending on who made the arrest. For example,
where an arrest is made by an Oakland police officer, 22 percent of forfeited bail
goes to the County of Alameda and the remainder to the City of Oakland.
41. 97 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
[Vol. 23
1307 and 1463, the court concluded that the arguments of the attorney
general were without merit.
Also lending support to the court's conclusion was the recent case
of Williams v. Dickey,42 cited by the plaintiff in McDermott,42a in which
the argument was made that the enactment of section 13521 had not
been opposed by the Association of California Cities nor the County
Supervisors Association because the legislature had made it clear that
the statute was intended to raise extra money, not to reallocate money
from the cities and counties to the police officer's training fund. This
argument appears to coincide with the conclusion of the McDermott
court that the legislature intended the regular bail funds to be distrib-
uted in accordance with sections 1307 and 1463 and that only the ad-
ditional penalty assessment under section 13521 was to be distributed to
the police officer's training fund.4"
The McDermott court also noted that -if the attorney general's
argument were to be accepted-that the penalty deposit be deemed
part of bail-consistency of interpretation would require that the pen-
alty assessment be included in, rather than added onto, the fines and
penalties enumerated in section 13521 to the detriment of local gov-
ernment treasuries.44  Under this interpretation-that the penalty as-
sessment should be considered as a part of the total amount of bail-
section 13521 would require that 25 percent of such amount be given
to the police officer's training fund and the local government treasuries
would thus be deprived of 25 percent of the funds already allocated
to them by Penal Code section 1463.
45
The court further stated that even if it were assumed that a judge
included the penalty assessment in the figure denominated "bail,"
there would still be no assurance that the judge included the deposit
for the penalty assessment in the amount determined to be sufficient
to secure the defendant's presence at trial.46 The court pointed out
that the amount necessary to secure the defendant's presence could be
set by the judge, the 25 percent penalty deposit then added, and the
42. Civil No. C-70, 1716 A.J.Z. (N.D. Cal., Apr. 30, 1971).
42a. Brief for Plaintiff at 5, McDermott v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1971).
43. 97 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 172. The attorney general, in McDermott, admitted that there is no
way to establish a standard to determine whether penalty assessments required by sec-
tion 13521 were added to or included in the bail. Brief for Respondent at 3, McDer-
mott v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971). The practice varies from county
to county and among different judges in the same county. See 97 Cal. Rptr. at
172; SAN FRANcisco ComrrrE ON CRim, A REPORT ON THE CRIuMNAL COURT Op
SAN FRNcisco, pt. I, Bail and O.R. Release 31 (1971).
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combined amount misnomered "bail."4 In cases involving arrest war-
rants where the magistrate undertakes fixing bail, the attorney general
has previously ruled that the magistrate must set bail in accordance
with sections 815(a) and 1275 and then add the penalty assessment to
the warrant.48 Thus, even were the judge to take into account the
penalty assessment in fixing bail, this would be in addition to the "rea-
sonable" bail established in accordance with section 1275 and would
thus be unconstitutional.
Summary
Penal Code section 1275 provides the relevant factors to be con-
sidered by a judge in establishing bail, and is the only statute which in-
structs the judge as to what factors to consider in determining the
amount the defendant should deposit to secure his release. Section
1275 does not refer to section 13521 at all. There is nothing in the
legislative history of section 1275 or of section 13521 to indicate that
the legislature ever intended that the judge should consider the pro-
spective penalty assessment in setting the amount of bail. On the
contrary, the express language of section 13521 and the allocation
provisions of sections 1307 and 1463 indicate that the penalty assess-
ment of section 13521 is an amount which has been added to that
previously established as "reasonable" bail. Furthermore, there ap-
pears to be no basis for contending that the legislature intended that
judges and magistrates determine the amount of appropriate bail under
section 1275, and then recalculate the bail to include the penalty de-
posit required under section 13521.
Sawyer v. Barbour-Penalty Assessments under
California Vehicle Code Section 773
In Sawyer v. Barbour,4 9 the court dealt with a provision in the
California Vehicle Code similar in form to section 13521.1 0 Former
California Vehicle Code section 773 provided that in order to reim-
burse the state for amounts appropriated for driver training, a penalty
was to be assessed on all bail set for all offenses involving violations of
47. 97 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
48. 35 Ops. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 77, 80-81 (1960). California Penal Code § 815(a)
(West 1970) specifies the procedure the judge shall follow in fixing bail when an ar-
rest warrant is issued. It provides in part: "At the time of issuing a warrant of ar-
rest, the magistrate shall fix the amount of bail which in his judgment in accordance
with the provisions of section 1275 will be reasonable and sufficient for the appearance
of the defendant following his arrest, if the offense is bailable."
49. 142 Cal. App. 2d 827, 300 P.2d 187 (1956).
50. Compare Cal. Stat. 1953, ch. 1878, § 1, at 3667, as amended, CAL. VEH.
CODE § 42051 (West 1971), with CAL. PEN. CODE § 13521 (West Supp. 1971).
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the Vehicle Code.51 In determining whether or not the penalty assess-
ment was an excessive addition to bail, the Sawyer court held that the
penalty assessment constituted a fine, not bail.52 The court noted that
for violations of the Vehicle Code, the proper procedure in fixing
bail was to determine from the bail schedule how much the defendant
would be required to post in order to secure his attendance at trial
and then to add the penalty assessment;53 the penalty assessment in
Vehicle Code section 773 was thus determined by the court to be in
addition to, and not part of, the bail.54 The court concluded that the
penalty assessment was merely an additional punishment imposed on
Vehicle Code violators and found this to be constitutional since the
penalty assessment did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
nor was it imposed ex post facto.55
Sawyer was relied upon almost exclusively by the court of appeals
in another case, People v. Norman,56 which upheld the constitutionality
of section 13521, and it is the principal if not sole case authority to
date for the proposition that the penalty deposit -under section 13521
does not constitute excessive bail.57 The court in Sawyer, however,
was primarily concerned with a situation in which forfeiture of bail
acts as a substitute for the payment of the defendant's fine and is
administratively treated by the court as equivalent to conviction for
the offense charged.58
The penalty assessment is an exaction imposed as punish-
ment for an unlawful act. It is laid on conviction, or on for-
feiture of bail which is equivalent to a conviction. . . . In the
event of acquittal it is returned.59
Although bail issued for a vehicular offense is theoretically sim-
51. Cal. Stat. 1953, ch. 1878, § 1, at 3667, as amended, CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 42051 (West 1971).
52. 142 Cal. App. 2d at 834-35, 300 P.2d at 191.
53. Id. at 834, 300 P.2d at 191.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 835-36, 300 P.2d at 192.
56. 252 Cal. App. 2d 381, 398-99, 60 Cal. Rptr. 609, 623-24 (1967).
57. In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968), where
the California Supreme Court, in passing upon a petitioner's proceeding in habeas cor-
pus to secure his release from the constructive custody of bail imposed under a
civil arrest order, deemed section 13521 constitutional as applied to bail in a criminal
case. This determination was dictum supplied in a footnote to the court's opinion,
and was unsupported by reasoning. The court in Harris merely cited People v.
Norman.
In Norman the defendant attacked the constitutionality of the section 13521 pen-
alty assessment. The court stated only that there was no merit to defendant's objec-
tions, citing Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal. App. 2d 827, 300 P.2d 187 (1956), in sup-
port of its conclusion.
58. 142 Cal. App. 2d at 835-36, 300 P.2d at 192.
59. Id.
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ilar to bail in a criminal case,"" in practice the courts have administra-
tively allowed such bail to become a means of securing payment of the
fine issued for the vehicular offense. 61 California Vehicle Code section
40512 provides that forfeiture of bail issued for a Vehicle Code viola-
tion may, at the court's discretion, serve to extinguish the defendant's
liability for the violation. 62  In 75 percent of all cases involving Ve-
hicle Code violations, the defendant deposits his bail as a means of
paying his fine, and upon forfeiture of that bail his penal liability is
extinguished. 63 Thus, in the vast majority of situations involving Ve-
hicle Code offenses, the Sawyer reasoning is appropriate-payment of
the penalty assessment at the time bail is posted is proper because the
posting of bail is in actuality the payment of the fine.
However, even though in the majority of cases the posting of bail
and the payment of the fine are considered synonymous, until the
time for appearance has passed and the bail has been forfeited, it is not
a fine. Until the bail has been forfeited, its theoretical function is to
insure the defendant's presence at trial.64 For most persons accused
of Vehicle Code violations no constitutional problem regarding bail
arises because the deposit of bail is made for the purpose of paying
the fine when the bail is forfeited. However, for the remaining Ve-
hicle Code violators-estimated at 25 percent-who make their deposit
of bail, not for the purpose of paying the fine, but for the purpose of
securing their release from custody, the reasoning of Sawyer would
appear erroneous. The defendant seeking his release from custody
is confronted with the choice of paying the penalty assessment or re-
maining in custody.
Among that 25 percent was petitioner Sawyer who deposited his
bail not for the purpose of extinguishing his penal liability under sec-
tion 40512, but for the purpose of securing his release from custody
and subsequently appearing to contest the charge against him.65 He
paid the penalty assessment in addition to the bail required to secure
his presence at trial under protest and later instituted an action to re-
cover the penalty assessment, contending that it violated his constitu-
tional right to reasonable bail.66 In light of Sawyer's particular predic-
ament, the Sawyer court acknowledged that a penalty assessment added
to bail might involve constitutional problems:
60. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 40511 (West 1971); Note, California Traffic Law
Administration, 12 STAN. L. REv. 388, 400 (1960).
61. See California Traffic Law Administration, supra note 60, at 400.
62. CAL. VEH. CODE § 40512 (West 1971).
63. See California Traffic Law Administration, supra note 60, at 400, 438.
64. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 40511 (West 1971); California Traffic Law Admin-
istration, supra note 60, at 400.
65. 142 Cal. App. 2d at 832, 300 P.2d at 190.
66. Id. at 832-33, 300 P.2d at 190.
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We do not construe section 773 as requiring a person charged with
an offense covered thereby to deposit the penalty assessment in cash
when he is admitted to bail on an undertaking with sureties. To
do so might impair the right to bail on sufficient sureties in viola-
tion of article I, section 6 of the Constitution. . . . We read
"deposit of bail" as meaning deposit of cash or deposit of an under-
taking with sufficient sureties. If a person charged with an offense
covered by section 773 deposits an undertaking, he may include
the amount of the penalty assessment in the undertaking or deposit
the amount in cash.
67
Even though the court apparently acknowledged the defendant's
constitutional right to be admitted to bail on an undertaking with
sufficient sureties, the court appears to have completely disregarded
the defendant's constitutional right to bail in a reasonable amount.
Thus, when Vehicle Code violators post bail to secure their release
from oustody, the court's holding in Sawyer appears to be in error
under the reasoning of McDermott. Even though the defendant secures
his release by means of cash or an undertaking with sureties, he is still
forced to deposit an amount in excess of that necessary to secure his
presence at trial in order to be released from custody.
68
In any event, the court's holding in Sawyer is clearly inapplicable
to Penal Code violators such as McDermott. Not only is there no com-
parable Penal Code provision to Vehicle Code section 40512, which
provides for the discretionary extinguishment of a defendant's penad
liability upon forfeiture of bail, but the plaintiff in McDermott was
seeking bail to secure his release from custody-not to provide for the
eventual payment of a fine.69
Sawyer's clouded reasoning which applied to section 13521 could
lead to the erroneous impression that while a penalty deposit under
section 13521 could not be justified as bail, such a deposit could be
justified as a penalty, separate and distinct from bail, which is an ad-
ditional forfeited amount imposed on one who commits the unlawful
act of failing to appear. The statutory requirement that the amount of
the penalty is to be deposited together with the bail when the defendant
seeks release could possibly be justified as the only practical way of
67. Id. at 837, 300 P.2d at 192-93.
68. See Cain v. United States, 148 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1945). In that case
appellant sought release on bail pending appeal of his case in which a judgment im-
posing both a fine and imprisonment had been rendered. Bail was set at $20,000 by
the trial court with the provision that the bail bond deposited also serve as security for
the payment of the $10,000 fine decreed in the judgment of the trial court. In reducing
bail from $20,000 to $10,000, the court of appeal held that it constituted excessive
bail to require the appellant to deposit, in addition to an amount sufficient to secure
his presence at trial, an additional amount to secure payment of the fine in order to
be released from custody.
69. 97 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72.
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insuring that the penalty, if incurred by the defendant because he failed
to appear, would ultimately be paid. While it cannot be disputed
that the legislature can impose more than one penalty for an unlawful
act 7°-in this situation it would be the forfeiture plus the penalty as-
sessment-and while it can be argued that the only practical way of en-
forcing the payment of the penalty assessment is to require payment
before the defendant is released, nonetheless the net effect of such an
interpretation is still to require the defendant to deposit excessive bail.
Whether the defendant is required to make the payment as bail, in
addition to bail, or as a deposit to insure payment of a fine for an offense
he may later commit, the fact remains that he is still forced to deposit
more than would otherwise be necessary to insure his presence at trial in
order to be released from custody. In other words, regardless of the
terms applied, the deposit of the penalty as a precondition to release has
the effect of bail, and to the extent that such deposit exceeds the amount
sufficient to secure the defendant's presence at trial, it is excessive and
therefore unconstitutional.
Bail Under Federal Statutes
The attorney general also argued in McDermott that if the pen-
alty deposit were interpreted to represent an addition to bail, then the
situation would be analogous to the bail required under certain federal
statutes.' Under those federal statutes, bail, in a civil suit for for-
feiture and damages, is set "relative" to the amount of the fine and
damages which may be assessed against the defendant according to the
attorney general.72 Therefore, by analogy, the attorney general con-
tended that it would be proper to require a defendant to post bail
relative to a penalty assessment he may later incur for the crime al-
leged.7' The attorney general's analogy of the federal statute to sec-
tion 13521 does not appear well founded. The federal statute pro-
vides:
And such person may be arrested and held to bail in such
sum as the district judge may order, not exceeding the sum of
$2,000, and twice the amount of the damages sworn to in the
affidavit of the person bringing the suit.74
The federal statute provides that the district judge is to determine
the amount of bail required, and the statutory provisions regarding
70. People v. Durrant, 119 Cal. 201, 208-09, 51 P. 185, 187 (1897); Sawyer
v. Barbour, 142 Cal. App. 2d 827, 836-37, 300 P.2d 187, 192 (1956).
71. Brief for Petitioner at 7, McDermott v. Superior Court, Civil No. 22844
(Sup. Ct., filed Oct. 1, 1971). See 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-33 (1970).
72. 31 U.S.C. § 233 (1970).
73. Brief for Petitioner at 7, McDermott v. Superior Court, Civil No. 22844
(Sup. Ct., filed Oct. 1, 1971).
74. 31 U.S.C. § 233 (1970) (emphasis added).
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the fine and damages set forth in the wording of the statute merely pro-
vides a ceiling for the permissible bail thus established. The defendant
is not necessarily forced to deposit the amount of the fine and dam-
ages provided for in the commission of the unlawful act in order to
secure his release. The requirements under the two statutes are, there-
fore, entirely distinguishable. The underlying purpose of the federal
statute is to limit the amount of bail which the judge can set. Con-
gress has apparently decided that the unlawful act committed by the
accused is not so heinous as to warrant the judge, in establishing rea-
sonable bail, to impose a bail on the accused exceeding the fine and
twice the amount of alleged damages. If desired, the California leg-
islature may also establish a similar ceiling for bail for a particular
offense, and it would also be appropriate for the legislature to establish
"reasonable" bail for a particular offense. However, there is no indi-
cation that the legislature intended to do either when it enacted section
13521.
Conclusion
McDermott v. Superior Court is the first decision to hold that the
penalty deposit required under section 13521 violates a defendant's
constitutional right to reasonable bail. The court concluded that since
the sole permissible purpose of bail in a criminal case is to insure the
defendant's appearance in court, and since section 1275 of the Penal
Code sets forth the appropriate criteria for establishing reasonable
bail-the seriousness of the offense charged, the prior criminal record
of the defendant and the probability of his appearing at trial-section
13521 imposed an excessive amount for the release of the defendant
and was thus unconstitutional. Whether the California Supreme Court
has upheld or rejected the decision of the court of appeals has not
been published at the date of this writing.75 Regardless of the final
disposition of McDermott, however, the California legislature should
amend section 13521 to clearly provide that the statute applies only in
cases where bail has been forfeited, and to eliminate the requirement of
a deposit for the penalty assessment as a precondition to release of
the defendant from custody. In this way, the revenue required for
police officers' training will be supplied without unnecessarily burden-
ing an innocent defendant seeking his release from custody.
Michael Desmarais*
75. The hearing was held on Dec. 6, 1971, but as of the date of this writing
no opinion has yet been given.
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